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Abstract 
The economic efficiency of the Danish, Icelandic and Norwegian cod fisheries is examined. 
For this purpose nonlinear aggregate models of these three fisheries are constructed. A 
particular mathematical approach to calculate the rent maximizing feedback control, i.e. the 
optimal dynamic harvesting policy as a function of the state variable, is applied. On the basis 
of this approach, the optimal harvesting policies for each of the three cod fisheries are 
calculated for years in the past for which biomass and catch data are available. Comparing the 
calculated optimal harvest and biomass quantities with the actual ones provides a measure of 
the degree of efficiency in these three cod fisheries. The ratio of optimal versus actual is used 
as performance indicator.  
The comparisons confirm the widely held belief that the cod harvesting policies of 
these countries have been hugely inefficient in the past. More interestingly, it appears that the 
inefficiency has been increasing over the last 3-4 decades, even after TAC-regulations 
replaced open access. 
 
 
 
 1 
Introduction1 
The primary purpose of this paper is to compare the relative efficiency of the fish harvesting 
policies of Iceland, Norway and Denmark as they have been in the past. By the term 
“harvesting policy” we mean the harvesting volume each year. So, efficiency here merely 
refers to appropriateness of the annual harvesting volumes. It does not, in particular, refer to 
the relative efficiency of the fishing industries in the three countries.  
Iceland, Norway and Denmark are all major fishing nations harvesting a number of 
fish species. We have chosen to concentrate on cod fishing as this is the single most important 
fishery, from an economic point of view, in all three countries. The three cod stocks in 
question are biologically distinct. The period for comparing their cod harvesting policies is 
1964-2000. The three nations conduct their cod fisheries in quite different contexts. First, 
there is a difference in national control over the respective fisheries. Prior to 1976 all three 
fisheries were characterized by open access. Since the extension of her fisheries jurisdiction to 
200 miles in 1976, Iceland has been in virtual sole control of her cod fishery. Norway, on the 
other hand, shares her cod stock, the Arctic cod, with Russia and must therefore decide on a 
harvesting policy jointly with Russia. Denmark is only one of several, mainly European 
Union, countries pursuing the North Sea cod fishery. Since the early 1980s the European 
Union has set the overall total allowable catch (TAC) for this fishery of which Denmark 
merely receives a share. Thus, compared to Iceland and Norway, Denmark probably has least 
control over her cod harvesting policy. In view of these differences in autonomy between the 
three countries, it is clearly of some interest to investigate whether this shows up in their 
respective cod harvesting policies.  Second, since the mid-1980s, the fisheries management 
systems employed in the three countries have been quite different. Stated very briefly, Iceland 
has since 1984 operated a more or less complete ITQ-system in her cod fishery. (Arnason, 
1993). Norway has for about the same period managed her cod fishery by means of quasi-
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permanent individual quotas (Anon., 1996d). In Denmark, however, the fishery has for the 
past two decades essentially been managed on the basis of a license limitation program 
supplemented with very short-term (down to two months) non-permanent, non-transferable 
vessel quotas (Vestergaard, 1998). Thus, it is clear that the quality of the harvesting rights 
held by individual companies in these three cod fisheries has differed greatly in recent years. 
It is often suggested that differences in the fisheries management regime, especially the 
quality of individual harvesting rights, may influence harvesting strategies (Arnason 1990, 
Johnson 1995, Scott 1999, Turris 1999). Therefore, it is of considerable interest to see if 
empirical evidence of this can be found.  
The paper employs an approach that adds empirical content and specific solution 
procedures to analytical fisheries models in order to generate empirically relevant solutions. 
More precisely, it suggests statistical estimation of the relationships typically used in 
analytical fisheries models and then employment of certain mathematical techniques to 
generate explicit feedback solutions to this class of models. In this way, the current approach 
attempts to bridge part of the gap between analytical and empirical fisheries models. It is 
essentially a simple aggregative description of a fishery, just like analytical models, but with 
empirically estimated relationships, just like empirical models. The same approach has been 
applied by Grafton, Sandal and Steinshamn (2000) to evaluate Canada's northern cod fishery. 
The model presented here is an aggregate bioeconomic model; that is a model that 
provides rules of thumb for quota management of the stock. This helps to avoid 
overparameterization of the model and lack of causality in the dynamics. For this reason the 
parameter estimations should not be judged as econometric analysis but rather as an attempt 
to keep down the number of parameters in order to make a representative aggregated dynamic 
model. 
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Of course, the procedure proposed in this paper does not provide detailed solutions to 
the fisheries problem. In fact, due to the level of aggregation in the underlying model, it is 
designed to provide the approximate key attributes of optimal harvesting paths. It is an 
approach to produce a comprehensive bioeconomic management model. The usefulness lies 
in its ability to focus on a few global attributes and to provide simple practical characteristics 
of an optimal management policy.  First, in many fisheries, as well as other natural resource 
use, it is simply not feasible, due to lack of data and other information, to construct a fully-
fledged empirical model. Under such circumstances bigger is not better. Second, in many 
cases, the management capability is simply inadequate to implement detailed management 
programs anyway. Third, the solution paths generated by our procedure are relatively easy to 
explain and therefore, perhaps, stand a better chance of being appreciated and adopted. 
Fourth, the proposed procedure makes it relatively easy to investigate the impact of 
exogenous changes on the economics of the fishery and optimal harvesting paths. Fifth, the 
procedure makes it relatively easy to compare, on even footing so to speak, the relative 
efficiency of the harvesting policies in different fisheries around the world. In fact, this is 
exactly the use this model is put to later in the paper where the relative efficiencies of the 
fisheries policies in Denmark, Iceland and Norway are compared.  
Although the approach has been developed for fisheries, there is no reason to restrict 
its use in this way. It can, with only slight modifications, be applied to other use of 
replenishable natural resources such as water resources, grasslands, forests and the 
environment in general.  
The paper is organized broadly as follows. In section 1 the theoretical model is 
explained. However, a bit more detailed outline is given in Appendix. In section 2 the model 
is applied to a comparative study of the fisheries policies in Denmark, Iceland and Norway. 
Finally, section 3 contains a brief discussion of the main results of the paper. 
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Theoretical model  
This section sketches the theoretical model that is used to determine an optimal harvesting 
policy.2 The objective is to discover the time path of harvest that maximizes the following 
functional: 
 
(1)     ∫∞ − Π
0
),( dtxhe tδ  
  
subject to *0 )(lim,)0(),,( xtxxxxhfx t === ∞→ > 0 
 
where x represents the fish stock biomass, h the flow of harvest, Π net revenues3 and f(.,.) is a 
function representing biomass dynamics. Dots are used to denote time derivatives, and δ is the 
discount rate. The symbol x0 represents initial biomass and x* some positive (steady state) 
biomass level to which the optimal program is supposed to converge.4  The functions Π and f 
can in principle be any functions as long as the second-order conditions are fulfilled.  In the 
following it is assumed that the functions fulfill the Mangasarian Sufficiency Theorem for 
infinite horizon (Theorem 13 in Seierstad and Sydsæter (1987)). 
 In the following applications we use the optimal feedback procedure developed and 
described in Sandal and Steinshamn (2001), and also applied by Grafton, Sandal and 
Steinshamn (2000). A short outline of this method is also given in Appendix. By an optimal 
feedback control is meant optimal harvest (the control) given as a direct function of the stock 
biomass (the state). The clue with this procedure, compared to traditional optimal control 
theory, is that the costate variable in the Hamiltonian is eliminated, using the maximum 
principle, instead of elaborated upon. This, as it turns out, makes it much easier to derive 
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feedback control laws for optimal harvest. The usefulness of feedback control laws is 
emphasized by Conrad and Clark (1987) and Clark (1990) among others. The result of the 
model is a mathematical rule that prescribes optimal harvest as a function of the prevailing 
stock: 
 
).( toptt xhh =  
 
Application: The performance of the Danish, Icelandic and Norwegian cod fisheries 
In this section the above approach is employed to throw some light on the relative efficiencies 
of the cod fisheries of Denmark, Iceland and Norway. In particular, the approach will be used 
to provide estimates of how close to (or distant from) the optimal path the actual utilization of 
the cod stocks of the three nations has been. For this purpose the parameters of the net 
revenue and growth function that form the building blocks of the aggregate fisheries model 
will be estimated. With these parameters the feedback method will be employed to calculate 
the optimal cod harvest for each of the three countries every year. Finally, comparing the 
calculated optimal paths with the actual ones provides an estimate of their relative 
efficiencies. In this section a zero discount rate is used in order to emphasize sustainability of 
the activity. As long as the intrinsic growth rate is large compared to the discount rate (which 
is the case here) positive discounting only implies a small alteration in the optimal harvest 
paths, see Sandal and Steinshamn (2001). 
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The empirical model 
First the details of the biological submodel will be given.  
 
Biological dynamics 
It is assumed that the instantaneous change in stock biomass equals natural growth less 
harvest: 
 
hxghxf
dt
dx
−=≡ )(),(  
 
where g(x) is a surplus growth function. It is not possible to estimate g(x) directly, because the 
available data is in discrete time. Consequently, we employ a discrete approximation in order 
to estimate the surplus growth. For Norway the following functional form (generalized 
logistic) gave the best fit 
 
,1)( 2 


−=
K
x
rxxg  
 
whereas for Denmark and Iceland the logistic function,  
 



−=
K
x
rxxg 1)( , 
 
yielded the best fit. In both cases K is the carrying capacity of the stock (Clark, 1990). The 
estimations were performed using NLREG and EViews5. The results of the estimations are 
shown in Table 1.  
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Table 1.  Statistical properties of the biological growth functions. K is 1000 tons. 
  Function Parameters t-statistics Other statistics6 
Denmark 
(n = 36) 



−
K
x
rx 1  
r=0.652155 
K=1,402 
4.87 
6.03 
R2 =0.11 
F=4.31 
DW=2.30 
Iceland 
(n = 45) 



−
K
x
rx 1  
r=0.4946 
K=2,919 
8.53 
3.83 
R2 = 0.25 
F=14.67 
DW = 1.52 
Norway 
(n = 22) 



−
K
x
rx 12  
r = 6.57E-4 
K = 2,485 
11.65 
23.73 
R2 = 0.51 
F = 23.16 
DW = 1.67 
 
 
For Denmark the whole North Sea stock is used as basis for the estimation. Data for 
stock and landings are taken from Anon (1997a). For Norway we use data for the Arctic cod 
stock from Anon (2001). For Iceland the relevant data relating to estimation of a growth 
function is given in Anon (1998a, 1998b and 2001b). The differences in scale of the 
respective fisheries are illustrated in Figure 1.  Notice that the Icelandic stock is significantly 
larger and less productive than the Norwegian stock. If the differences in costs and prices are 
not to extreme one should expect a higher moratorium level and steeper optimal harvest path 
for Iceland. This qualitative behaviour is indeed reflected in the calculated optimal paths. 
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Figure 1. The biological growth function for Denmark, Iceland and Norway
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Economic model 
The generic net revenue function employed in the empirical model is: 
 
π(h, x) = p(h, x)h – C(x, h). 
 
where p(h, x) represents the (inverse) demand function for landed cod, and C(h, x) is the cost 
function associated with the harvest process. All prices are real prices deflated by the 
respective countries' consumer price index. In reality the prices also change over time due to 
changes in taste, etc. This calls for a non-autonomous analysis, which is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
Several forms of the demand and cost functions were estimated for the three countries. 
Due to differences in data availability and industry structure between the three countries it is 
most convenient to discuss the estimation of these functions for each country in turn. 
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Denmark 
Using data from Anon (1991) and Anon (1996b) a inverse demand function for cod landings 
of the form p(h) = a - bh was estimated. Adjusted for autocorrelation it turned out that the 
slope coefficient was statistically insignificant. We therefore proceed on the assumption of a 
constant price of cod landings of DKr 10.4. The estimation results are summarized in Table 2. 
A likely reason for this result is that Danish cod landings are quite small relative to the total 
supply in the North Sea market area, and consequently the price is not very sensitive to 
variations in Danish landings. 
Because we only have data for two years in Anon (1996a), we have calibrated a 
variable cost function (see Howitt 1995 for an example). We have calibrated on the whole 
North Sea stock but have used the Danish part of the catches in The North Sea. The 
calibration gives the following result: 
 
C( h, x) = 29.618 h2/x 
 
The Danish net revenue function thus reads: 
 
π(h, x) = 10.4h – 29.618 h2/x, 
 
when h and x are measured in metric tons. 
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Table 2. Statistical properties of the estimated demand functions. Estimation procedure: OLS, 
except GLS for Iceland. 
  Function Parameters t-statistics Other statistics7 
Denmark 
(n=17) 
ahp =)(  10.40 11.23 R2=0.0 
F=10.80 
DW=2.07 
Iceland 
(n=48) 
ahp =)(  84.215 10.4 R2=0.88 
F= 337.3 
DW=2.21 
Norway 
(n = 33) 
equation (2) a = 9.52 
b = -2.07E-6 
c =  -11763 
20.50 
-6.73 
-4.40 
R2 = 0.58 
F = 23.28 
DW = 1.18 
 
 
Iceland 
The inverse demand function for cod landings, p = a - bh, was estimated using monthly data 
in 1996 and 1999 (Anon 1998b, Anon 1999 and Anon 200b). A generalized least squares 
estimated method with autocorrelation was used, and it turned out that the slope coefficient is 
statistically insignificant. On the other hand a dummy variable (unity in April 1997, otherwise 
zero) was found to be needed. As a result, we proceed on the assumption of fixed price of cod 
landings, which was estimated to be ISK 84.215 per kg. of landings (1998 prices). The key 
estimation results are further summarized in Table 2. 
The reason for this apparent price inflexibility may be that during the data period most 
Icelandic landings of cod took place within vertically integrated fish harvesting and 
processing firms with the landing price of cod to a great extent simply representing a transfer 
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price between two stages of the overall operation. In addition to this, many of the independent 
harvesting operations supplied their catches of cod to processing firms according to fixed 
price contracts. For these reasons, and in spite of the emergence of auction markets for fish 
landings in recent years, the wetfish price of cod was  almost completely insensitive to short 
term variations in supply.  
The cost function, 
x
h
ahC
2
)( = , was estimated using a combination of cross-section 
and time series data, i.e. a balanced panel data, on variable costs. The main data source was 
Anon (1998c). The time period was 1985 to 1995, and the total number of observations was 
307. The cost data are in fixed 1998-prices. A generalized least squares (GLS) estimation 
technique based on White’s heteroscedasticity-consistent method was employed. The key 
estimation results are:  
 
C(h, x) = 17.343 h2/x, 
  
with more details to be found in Table 3.  
The Icelandic net revenue function therefore is: 
 
π(h, x) = 84.215⋅h– 17.343h2/x 
 
where h and x are measured in 1000 tons. 
 
Norway 
The inverse demand function for Norwegian  cod landings was estimated on the basis of 
annual data on real prices and landings obtained from Anon (2001a). The following form gave 
the best statistical properties: 
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(2)    [ ]


<+
>++
=
−
−−
.1330
1330),( 2.2
22
xifhcxa
xifhcxbxahxp   
 
where a, b and c are parameters. The inclusion of the stock in the inverse demand function 
may seem a bit odd, but we must remember that buyers of landed fish are highly professional 
buyers who probably take stock estimates into account. 
The key estimation results are listed in Table 2.  The data are assumed to represent the 
demand function as the supply function is exogenously given through a binding TAC 
regulation scheme with little or no alternative harvest outlets. 
Annual data from Anon (1995, 1996c, 1997d, 1998d, 1999a, 2000) are used to 
estimate a variable cost function. Variable costs are total variable costs for the trawlers 
multiplied by the share of cod in total harvest and deflated with the consumer price index 
(1998=100). The following simple functional form gave the best fit: 
 
x
h
xhC α=),(  
DQG WKH SDUDPHWHU . ZDV HVWLPDWHG WR  VHH 7DEOH  7KHUHIRUH WKH 1RUZHJLDQ Qet 
revenue function is: 
 
[ ]



<−+
>−++
=
−
−−
.13308824
13308824
),(
22.2
222
xif
x
hhcxah
xif
x
hhcxbxah
hxπ  
 
when h and x are measured in 1000 metric tons. 
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Table 3. Statistical properties of the estimated cost functions. Estimation procedure: Norway 
OLS, Iceland GLS. 
 Function Parameters t-statistics Other statistics8 
Denmark9 
x
hhxC
2
),( α=  .  = 29.618   
Iceland 
(n = 307) x
hhxC
2
),( α=  .  = 17.343 19.49 R
2
 = 0.86 
 
Norway 
(n = 6) x
hhxC α=),(  .  = 8824 110.02 R
2
 = 0.99 
DW = 2.57 
 
 
Comparative efficiency 
Having completed the construction of our fisheries model we are now in a position to assess 
the relative efficiency of the cod harvesting policies followed by the three countries in the 
past. For this purpose two main indicators are employed: (i) the actual versus optimal stock 
ratio, and (ii) the actual versus optimal harvest ratio. The target reference value for both 
indicators are one. 
It may be noted that the individual country’s net revenue functions are expressed in 
different currencies and price levels. Moreover, they relate to widely different average 
biomass levels as illustrated in Figure 1. This, however, does not pose problems for 
comparison as the performance indicators to be used are dimensionless. 
The comparative results are primarily presented by means of diagrams. This has the 
advantage of conveying all data points simultaneously. However, in order to facilitate 
efficiency comparison for the whole period, simple numerical measures have been devised. 
The one used to assess the performance of the stock policy is:  
 14 
 
),0[1 ∞∈=
∑
=
T
T
t
tη
η  
 
where T is length of the period and 
*
x
x
act
t
t =η ,where acttx  is the actual stock at time t and x* is 
the optimal steady state.  
 Obviously, the most desirable value of η is unity; η < 1 suggests an economically 
overexploited stock and η > 1 suggests underexploitation of the stock.  
 To assess the performance of the harvest policy we use10: 
 
),,0[ ∞∈= ∑
∑
opt
t
act
t
h
h
ϕ  
 
where optth  is the optimal level of harvest at time t (which may be zero) and actth  the actual 
harvest at time t. Optimal harvest at each point of time is calculated using the optimal 
feedback rule, i.e. ).( acttoptt xhh = Obviously, ϕ = 1 indicates a perfectly efficient harvesting 
policy; ϕ > 1 indicates economic overharvesting and ϕ < 1 economic underharvesting. Both 
these relations are performance indicators and, as such, independent of the scale of the 
fisheries. 
Consider first the performance of the cod stock policy in each country. This is 
illustrated in figures 2 – 4. In these figures the actual biomass relative to the optimal one (the 
η-measure) is presented. In addition a horizontal reference line corresponding to the fishing 
moratorium level (where it is optimal to cease fishing) is drawn in the diagrams. 
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Figure 2. Denmark: Stock relative to optimal steady state
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
Year
stock
optimal s.s.
moratorium
 
 
Figure 3. Iceland: Stock relative to optimal steady state
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Figure 4. Norway: Stock relative to optimal steady state
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1
1,2
1,4
1,6
1,8
19
64
19
66
19
68
19
70
19
72
19
74
19
76
19
78
19
80
19
82
19
84
19
86
19
88
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
Year
stock
optimal s.s.
moratorium
 
As illustrated in Figures 2-4, the cod stock biomass for these three countries is far 
below the economically optimal level (i.e. unity in the diagrams) for most of the period. 
Moreover, all three cod stocks exhibit a clear downward trend relative to the optimal level 
over time. Thus, the model confirms the general view that the North-Atlantic and North Sea 
cod stocks are overexploited, and the overexploitation is getting worse. There is no sign of 
any change in this trend after TAC-regulations were introduced in the late seventies.  
In Denmark the cod stock never falls below the moratorium level. However, the stock 
only manages to exceed the optimal equilibrium level once, namely in 1971. In Iceland, the 
cod stock is above the calculated optimal equilibrium level both in the late sixties and in the 
late seventies. Since then, however, the stock development has generally been downhill, and 
after 1982 the stock has been below the fishing moratorium level. It should be noted, 
however, that due to the nature of the estimated Icelandic growth function, this moratorium 
occurs at a higher stock level than for Norway and much higher than Denmark. It reflects that 
the Icelandic stock is larger and less productive than the Norwegian (as seen from their 
carrying capacities and maximal growth). The Danish stock is relatively small and productive. 
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The development of the Norwegian cod stock is quite similar to the Icelandic one. It begins 
with a good period in the mid-sixties when the stock is well above the optimal steady state. 
Thereafter it declines, especially in the 1970s, and languishes at very depressed levels in the 
1980s getting below the fishing moratorium level.  
For the period 1964-2000 the average η-measure is closest to the optimal level for 
Norway ( 77.0=η ). The corresponding η-measures are 0.68 for Iceland and only 0.57 for 
Denmark. Looking at the period with TAC-regulations (1978 – 2000) the rankings of the 
countries remain the same but the average performances have decreased for all three, 
indicating, as already noted, that TAC-regulations have had no significant positive effect on 
stock performance in any of these countries. This is documented in Table 4. 
       
Table 4. Cod biomass relative to the optimal  (η-measures). 
 Common data period 
1964 - 2000 
Period with TAC-regulation 
1978 – 2000 
Denmark 0.57 0.49 
Iceland 0.68 0.60 
Norway 0.77 0.61 
 
 
Let us now turn to the performance of the harvest SROLFLHV WKH 3-measure) in each of 
the three countries.11 From Figures 5 – 7, which illustrate actual and optimal harvest against 
the stock together with the surplus production function, it is evident that the harvesting for all 
three cod stocks have been severely excessive. The harvesting performance indicators are 
presented in Table 5. 
 18 
In all three countries, the cod harvesting policies have been severely excessive. The 
Icelandic case is the worst with Norway not far behind. The degree of overexploitation has 
also significantly increased in both Iceland and Norway during the latter part of the period. 
Compared to the other two countries Denmark has operated the most stable harvesting policy, 
but, unfortunately, it has been stable overexploitation. By contrast, Iceland's harvesting policy 
is the most volatile. It features some years of close to optimal harvesting and even 
underharvesting in the early period. But Iceland also has the most severe cases of excessive 
overharvesting, i.e. substantial harvest when, according to the calculations of this paper, a 
harvest moratorium should have been imposed..  
For the common data period (1964 - 2000), the average exploitation rate relative to the 
optimal is highest for Iceland (ϕ = 3.71). This means that during this period, the cod harvest 
in Iceland has on average been more than three times the optimal one. In Denmark and 
Norway the average levels of overharvesting have been lower, 2.60 and 2.73, respectively. 
For the period with TAC-regulation things become even worse. The ranking of the countries 
remains the same, but the degree of overexploitation has increased in all three. 
 
Table 5. Efficiency of the cod harvesting policies (ϕ-measures) 
 Common data period 
1964 - 2000 
Period with TAC-regulation 
1978 – 2000 
Denmark 2.60 2.96 
Iceland 3.71 5.74 
Norway 2.73 4.13 
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Figure 5. Denmark: Growth function and actual and optimal harvest against stock
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Figure 6. Iceland: Growth function and actual and optimal harvest against stock
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Figure 7. Norway: Growth function and actual and optimal harvest against stock
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From Figures 5 - 7 it is seen that the optimal harvest paths are close to straight lines 
for Denmark and Iceland but is quite curved for Norway. This difference is due to the 
estimated price-harvest relationship for Norway. It is also interesting to note that, for 
Denmark and Norway, the actual harvest policies are close to the optimal policies shifted 
upward by a constant. Thus, the actual harvest policies for these countries have had roughly 
the same slope as the optimal policy. This may be partly explained by a high time preference. 
For Iceland, on the other hand, the actual harvest policy has a different slope from the optimal 
one. In the case of Iceland, the actual harvest looks like an attempt to have a constant harvest 
rate irrespective of the stock size.  
 
Discussion 
This paper contributes, as we see it, primarily in two different ways. First, the paper 
demonstrates that it is now quite feasible – in fact relatively easy - to calculate optimal 
feedback policies for renewable resource extraction on the basis of simple aggregate models. 
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Secondly, the paper provides quantitative information about the economic efficiency, or rather 
inefficiency, of the cod fisheries in Denmark, Iceland and Norway in recent decades.  
 Optimal feedback policies calculated on the basis of simple aggregate models can be 
useful in a variety of ways: First, obviously, such calculations can be employed as a quick 
check on the efficiency of existing policies. Second, such calculations can provide 
preliminary estimates of optimal paths and the accompanying economic benefits. Depending 
on the deviation from the current situation and the magnitude of the potential gains, this can 
then be used to judge whether a more in-depth study or even a policy change are justified. 
Third, as in this paper, deviations from calculated optimal paths can be used for international 
efficiency comparisons and, possibly, to throw light on the relative efficacy of different 
fisheries management regimes. It has been an aim to focus on a few main quantities 
encompassing the key features of the stocks. 
 Our comparative study of the three cod fisheries is perhaps more striking in terms of 
the similarities it uncovers rather than the differences. For all three countries the efficiency of 
their cod fisheries, measured as the ratio between actual and optimal levels, appears to have 
been quite low. Moreover, for all three countries this efficiency shows a declining trend since 
the 1960s. This trend is, of course, in broad accordance with the prediction of fisheries 
economics for open access fisheries and therefore as expected. What is mildly surprising, 
however, is that in spite of much greater national control over the cod fisheries since the 
1970s (at least in Iceland and Norway) and greatly more extensive fisheries management 
since then, there are very few signs of a reversal in this trend of declining efficiency. This is 
reflected by the fact that the performance indicators unequivocally are worse in the period 
from 1978 onwards, with TAC-regulations, than it was before 1978. 
 During the last decade or so the cod fisheries in the three countries have been subject 
to somewhat different fisheries management systems. The cod fishery in Denmark is managed 
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on the basis of the Danish share of the total allowable catch and short-term vessel quotas (up 
to 3 month) (Vestergaard, 1998). The Norwegian cod fishery has been managed on the basis 
of individual but nontransferable quotas (Anon., 1996d) and the Icelandic cod fishery has 
been managed primarily on the basis of transferable quotas (Arnason, 1996). The differential 
effects of these management systems, if any, do not show up in our efficiency measures. 
These measures, of course, are restricted to aggregate harvest rates and biomass levels, so 
these results do not exclude different economic returns in the fisheries deriving from the 
different operational efficiencies of the respective industries. Nevertheless, it is interesting to 
note that to the end of our data period (2000), the theoretical superiority of individual quota 
systems (see e.g. Hannesson 1994) does not seem to be reflected in the build up of cod 
biomass towards the optimal level, neither in Iceland nor Norway. It may, of course, be the 
case, that this impact of the individual quota systems in Iceland and Norway  really only in 
effect since about 1990  is yet to emerge.  
 Our initial hypothesis that the countries with the highest degree of autonomy have the 
highHVW LQFHQWLYHV WR PDQDJH WKHLU ILVKHULHV ZHOO LV WR D FHUWDLQ H[WHQW VXSSRUWHG E\ WKH -
coefficient measuring stock-exploitation. Denmark, who has the lowest degree of autonomy, 
DOVR KDV WKH ORZHVW -value. The hypothesis is, however, not supported by the 3-coefficient 
measuring harvest efficiency, as the Denmark has the lowest value here too, indicating the 
lowest degree of harvest overexploitation. 
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Appendix 
The current value Hamiltonian, corresponding to problem (1), may be written as: 
 
),(),(),,( xhfxhxhHH λλ +Π== , 
 
where λ is the current value costate variable. Assuming an interior solution (i.e. positive 
biomass and harvest), the necessary first-order conditions for solving the maximization 
problem (Kamien and Schwartz, 1991) include: 
  
.
,0
x
h
H
H
−⋅=
=
λδλ
 
 
Upon differentiating the Hamiltonian function with respect to time, these conditions, 
combined with the dynamic constraint in (1), yield12 
 
(A1)      xH  ⋅⋅= λδ . 
 
The interior optimum condition, 0=hH , implies that the costate variable, λ, can be 
rewritten as a function of x and h: 
 
),( xhfh
h Λ≡Π−=λ . 
 
As this is a known function (provided the functions Π and f are known), it can be used to 
eliminate the costate variable, λ, from the problem. More to the point, it is now possible to 
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define the following new function (different from the Hamiltonian as a function but always 
equal to it in value): 
 
(A2)    ),(),(),(),( xhfxhxhxhP Λ+Π=  
 
For fisheries management purposes it is extremely useful to be able to express the 
optimal harvest at each point in time as a function of the fish stock biomass at that time. Let 
us refer to this as the function h(x). In the optimal control literature, this is referred to as a 
feedback control (Seierstad and Sydsæter 1987, p. 161, Kamien and Schwartz 1991, p. 262). 
So, we seek the feedback control, h(x), for problem (1). Inserting this unknown function into 
(A2) and differentiating with respect to time yields: 
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But by construction HP  ≡ . Hence, by (A1) we obtain the first-order differential equation that 
can be used to determine the feedback control: 
 
(A3)    ).,( xh
x
h
h
P
x
P
dx
dP Λ⋅=
∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
≡ δ  
 
Solving (A3) or, if that is more convenient, (A2) for the harvest, h, yields the desired 
feedback control.  
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Endnotes 
                                                        
1
  We would like to thank Sveinn Agnarsson and Frank Jensen for valuable research assistance in 
preparing this article.  Financial support from the Nordic Council of Ministers is gratefully acknowledged. 
2
 The model can also be generalized to include general stochastic processes (Sandal and Steinshamn, 
1997). 
3
  Net revenues are simply defined as economic profits, i.e. revenues in excess of current operation costs 
(outlays). This is all on cash flow basis.  
4
  Indeed, the last constraint in (1), which can be derived as a transversality condition, may be regarded as 
the requirement of fishery sustainability.  In practice there will always be sporadic disturbances such that the 
steady state will serve as a target point around which the optimal policy will fluctuate rather than converge to. 
5
 NLREG; copyright Phillip H. Sherrod, 4410 Gerald Place, Nashville TN, 37205-3806 USA, 
(phil.sherrod@sandh.com). EViews; Quantitative Micro Software, 4521 Campus Drive, Irvine, CA 92612-2699. 
6
  It may be pointed out that for biomass growth functions goodness of fit as measured by R2 is generally 
very low. 
7
  For Denmark the R2 statistic is necessarily zero as the regression is on a constant only. 
8
  Since there is only one explanatory variable the F statistic is incomputable. In the case of Iceland, which 
utililizes panel data the DW-statistic is meaningless.  
9
  The Danish cost function has been calibrated and hence there is no statistics 
10
 An alternative measure would be (hact-hopt)/hopt 7KLV KRZHYHU LV FRPSOHPHQWDU\ WR 3 LQ WKH VHQVH WKDW
they add to one. Which one to use is therefore a matter of taste.  
11
  We have chosen not to show the tϕ -diagrams as ∞→tϕ  whenever a harvest moratorium is optimal. 
These cases show up as missing points in the diagrams, rendering the diagrams uninformative. 
12
 λλ  HxHhHH xh ++= . From the necessary conditions, 0=hH , λδλ −=xH . Finally, by the 
construction of the Hamiltonian function, xH =λ  
